ARISTOTLE'S LIBERALISM OF VIRTUE

Students of Aristotle's political thought wrestle with a deep tension. If friendship is the basis of community, Aristotle's ideal community must be rather clannish and exclusive. It is an uncomfortable view of political life from the standpoint of the twenty-first century, both for liberals and liberalism's critics. And many of Aristotle's own positions, for example his strong criticism of Plato's city in speech, do not seem to square with it. Is it the right picture? This book argues that, from Aristotle's perspective, a politics focused on virtue neither necessarily excludes persons who are not fully virtuous from politics nor coerces citizens who are not wholly virtuous into acting well. Aristotle makes debate and community feeling compatible by reconstructing tribal feelings (or associative emotions) into something politically capable. Debate is also transformed in the process by the special commitments one makes when entering into a political association. This, in brief, is Aristotle's answer to liberals and their critics: A certain kind of community and a certain kind of debate make liberalism possible.